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Assessing the Valuation and Risk Implications of Fair Value Accounting for 
Liabilities: Evidence from FAS 159’s Reported Gains and Losses 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the implications of fair value liability gains and losses arising from the 
adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (hereafter FAS 159). We find 
a positive correspondence between a firm’s FAS 159 fair value liability gains and losses and 
stock returns. Further analysis indicates that fair value gains and losses from liabilities 
attributable to the change in a firm’s own credit risk, which are considered counter-intuitive by 
critics of fair value accounting for liabilities, are also positively related to returns. Lastly, we 
document that the volatility of earnings that incorporate FAS 159 liability fair value gains and 
losses is positively associated with market measures of firm risk. Our study contributes to the 
controversy over recognition of liability fair value gains and losses by providing direct empirical 
evidence that such gains and losses are perceived as economic income by market participants.  
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 1 
1. Introduction 
We examine how investors perceive the valuation and risk implications of recognized fair 
value gains and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities (hereafter gains (losses) 
from liabilities). Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (hereafter FAS 159), The 
Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities, allows firms to elect fair value 
as the measurement basis for certain financial assets and liabilities. The fair value option is 
applied on an instrument-by-instrument basis and the decision to elect the fair value option is 
irrevocable. 
Because FAS 159 gives firms the option to fair value their financial liabilities, the 
standard has been controversial and has drawn considerable attention. This is particularly so 
during the financial crisis in 2008 when some banks reported greater than expected accounting 
income due to the application of FAS 159.
1
 Particularly, the inclusion of a firm’s own credit risk 
when measuring the fair value of liabilities remains one of the most debated aspects of fair value 
accounting (Barth, Hodder and Stubben 2008). In fact, because of the ongoing controversy on 
gains (losses) from liabilities, the FASB agreed in Jun 2012 to have firms report such gains 
(losses) in other comprehensive income instead of net income.
2
 Notwithstanding the controversy, 
there is relatively little evidence regarding the implications of reported gains (losses) from 
liabilities. An important reason for this paucity of empirical evidence is the limited availability of 
data, which results from most financial liabilities not being recognized on a fair value 
                                                 
1
 For example, Goldman Sachs reported US$ 845 million of income before extraordinary items in the 3
rd
 quarter of 
2008, but gains from the fair value change in liabilities were US$ 3.8 billion. Without these gains, Goldman Sachs 
would have reported a loss of US$ 3 billion. Similarly, JPMorgan reported a US$ 54 million loss in the same quarter, 
but it would have reported a US$ 13.1 billion loss without the gains from the fair value change in liabilities.  
2
 FASB also plans that the other comprehensive income resulting from change in a firm’s creditworthiness will be 
realized when firms settle the debt. However, the decision is not finalized (Whitehouse 2012).   
 2 
measurement basis under existing accounting rules.
3
 Fair value gains and losses arising from the 
adoption of FAS 159 are reported as a separate line item in the financial statements. We hand-
collect these gains and losses from the financial statements and collect other, more detailed 
information about the nature of fair value changes in these elected instruments from the FAS 159 
footnote disclosures to analyze the implications of those gains (losses) from liabilities.  
We examine the implications of fair value accounting for liabilities along two dimensions. 
First, we investigate whether reported FAS 159 accounting gains (losses) from liabilities 
included in earnings are related to firm value. Economic theory suggests that there are valuation 
and risk implications from fair valuing a firm’s liabilities.4 If a firm’s reported accounting 
income gains (losses) reflect economic gains (losses) to the firm’s equity holders (e.g., the 
impact of changes in macroeconomic conditions or a firm’s own credit risk), then fair value 
gains (losses) from a firm’s liabilities should be value relevant. In contrast, critics of fair valuing 
liabilities view the gains (losses) from liabilities differently. Liabilities are seldom transferred but 
held until their maturity in most cases. Hence, the realizability of liability gains and losses can be 
at most theoretical. Furthermore, critics argue that deteriorating market or firm condition leading 
to gains does not make intuitive sense. For example, firms will recognize gains when their 
creditworthiness declines or when market interest rates increase because of deteriorating market 
conditions. If gains (losses) from liabilities are perceived as only theoretical, then they should 
have no practical implications and should not be value relevant. 
 
                                                 
3
 SFAS 107 requires entities to disclose fair valued liabilities, but does not require firms to recognize the changes in 
fair value of liabilities as earnings. Since the amount of fair valued liabilities can change because of new issuance or 
settlement of liabilities, SFAS 107 disclosures do not provide information about the precise change in the fair value 
of liabilities.   
4
 Bohn (2000) provides a survey of the relevant research pertaining to the relation between debt value, credit risk 
and equity value. See also Barth and Landsman (1995) for a discussion of the accounting issues pertaining to fair 
value accounting for liabilities. 
 3 
Second, we examine the implications of FAS 159 gains (losses) from liabilities for firm 
risk. Prior research suggests that a full fair value financial reporting model enables investors to 
better assess firm risk (Hodder, Hopkins and Wahlen 2006). This is because reported fair value 
information informs investors about a firm’s underlying economic volatility. In that regard, 
greater inclusion of fair value estimates for firms that elect FAS 159 adoption (or other fair value 
measurement standards) should result in a net income figure that better reflects the firm’s 
riskiness. A stated objective of FAS 159 is to mitigate unnecessary volatility in reported earnings 
resulting from measuring related assets and liabilities differently. If this objective is achieved, we 
expect the earnings volatility of firms that recognize gains (losses) from liabilities to more 
closely reflect a firm’s risk.5 However, if gains (losses) from liabilities add noise to earnings as 
critics argue, then earnings that include such gains (losses) should not be incrementally relevant 
for firm risk over earnings that do not include these gains (losses). 
Using firms that adopt FAS 159 for their liabilities, we find a positive association 
between a firm’s stock returns and gains (losses) from financial liabilities.6 These results extend 
prior research that investigates the value relevance of fair value gains and losses of financial 
assets (e.g., Barth 1994). We also assess the value relevance of gains (losses) from liabilities that 
are due to a firm’s own credit risk changes and gains (losses) from liabilities that are due to 
changes in overall market conditions as reflected in market interest rates. To perform this test, 
we hand-collect the fair value gains (losses) in each liability instrument from 10Q and 10K 
                                                 
5
 Prior to the adoption of FAS 159, fair value changes of certain assets were included in earnings whereas fair value 
changes of corresponding liabilities were not included in earnings. However, market interest rate and other 
macroeconomic factors affect both the fair values of assets and liabilities. Hence, the inclusion of fair value changes 
of assets may induce artificial earnings volatility which does not fully reflect the underlying economic risk of the 
firm. The adoption of FAS 159 allows firms to measure both assets and corresponding liabilities using a consistent 
measurement basis. The volatility of reported net income based on a single measurement basis should thus be a 
better reflection of the economic risk of the firm.  
6
 We note that our results may not be generalizable because we only examine firms that adopted FAS159. We also 
note that we do not compare firms that voluntarily adopt FAS 159 to the firms that do not; consequently, 
endogeneity is not a significant concern in our analyses.  
 4 
footnotes. We group the fair value gains (losses) from these liability instruments into two 
categories - gains (losses) from debt instruments (i.e., liabilities whose fair values are more likely 
to be affected by a firm’s credit risk changes) and gains (losses) from other instruments. We find 
that gains (losses) from both debt and other instruments are positively associated with a firm’s 
stock returns. These results suggest that the controversial fair value gains and losses from 
liabilities attributable to the change in a firm’s own credit risk are value relevant.  
Some firms voluntarily disclose the liability gains and losses attributable to changes in 
their own credit risk. These disclosures allow us to clearly distinguish gains and losses arising 
from a firm’s own credit risk changes from gains and losses arising from changes in other factors. 
Using this reduced sample of hand-collected information from 10Q and 10K filings, we still find 
that gains and losses attributable to changes in a firm’s own credit risk are value relevant.  
Lastly, we examine whether the volatility of earnings that includes fair value changes of 
liabilities is a better proxy for firm risk. Previous research uses self-constructed income measures 
to compute a full fair value income measure (e.g., Hodder et al. 2006). In contrast, we use 
reported income measures in our risk-relevance tests.
7
 First, unlike Hodder et al. (2006), we find 
a reduction in earnings volatility after including FAS 159 gains (losses) from liabilities. Second, 
consistent with Hodder et al. (2006), our results indicate that the volatility of earnings that 
incorporate FAS 159 fair value gains (losses) is incrementally risk relevant to investors. These 
results are consistent with the FASB’s claim that reported earnings will have lower volatility and 
will better reflect market and other firm risks when firms measure both financial assets and 
financial liabilities at fair value.  
                                                 
7
 Notwithstanding these differences, we also note that our income measure does not purport to represent a full fair 
value income measure. This is because many items in the balance sheet are still not recognized at fair value.   
 5 
We contribute to existing research that addresses the controversy surrounding fair value 
accounting for liabilities. Barth et al. (2008) find that the relation between credit risk changes 
and equity returns is significantly less negative for firms with more debt. That is, the negative 
effect related to the increase in a firm’s credit risk is partially offset by the gains from liabilities, 
indicating such gains are priced by the market. Although similar in spirit to Barth et al. (2008), 
our study is different in at least three important ways.  
First, we examine the value relevance of overall gains and losses from liabilities resulting 
from the change in both the market interest rate risk (and other macroeconomic factors) and a 
firm’s own credit risk.  In contrast, Barth et al. (2008) focus only on the liability gains and losses 
resulting from the change in a firm’s credit risk. Although this is an important issue, the debate 
for recognizing the fair value change in liabilities is not confined to gains (losses) from the 
change in a firm’s own credit risk. Among the arguments in favor of recognizing gains (losses) 
from liabilities is that fair valuing liabilities will lead to better a match between fair valued assets 
and liabilities since both sides of balance sheets are affected by changes in market interest rates 
and other macroeconomic factors as well as by the change in an entity’s creditworthiness. 
Second, firms did not recognize gains and losses from liabilities as earnings during Barth et al.’s 
(2008) sample period. As a result, they could not conduct a direct test of the value relevance of 
fair value gains and losses from liabilities. By using the data on firms that recognize gains and 
losses from liabilities in the post FAS 159 period, we are able to provide direct evidence on the 
value relevance of reported fair value gains and losses from liabilities. Third, Barth et al. (2008) 
study the implications for nonfinancial firms. However, the debate on the fair value gains and 
losses from liabilities is most relevant for financial firms because of their sizable holdings of 
financial assets and liabilities. In fact, it was financial institutions that triggered the controversy 
 6 
regarding the recognition of fair value gains and losses from liabilities in the 2008 crisis period 
by reporting larger than expected earnings as a result of the liability gains recognized.  
Recent experimental research suggests that market participants may not be able to fully 
understand the valuation and risk implications of changes in fair value of a firm’s liabilities (e.g., 
Gaynor, McDaniel and Yohn 2011; Koonce, Nelson and Shakespeare 2011). Unlike that research, 
we provide direct evidence on the value and risk relevance of fair value gains and losses from 
liabilities of financial firms. In this regard, our study complements Barth et al. (2008). Overall, 
our study helps to inform standard setters on the financial reporting implications of fair value 
measurement of liabilities by documenting the benefits of fair value accounting for liabilities.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and research design. Section 4 discusses the main results and the 
results of additional analyses. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Institutional background 
FAS 159 was promulgated to permit firms the option (i.e., the “fair value option”) to 
measure financial instruments at fair value on an instrument-by-instrument application. Under 
this standard, firms have the discretion to irrevocably elect fair value as the initial and 
subsequent measurement attribute for certain financial assets and liabilities. All fair value 
changes must be reflected in earnings, including fair value changes resulting from changes in 
market interest rates (and other macroeconomic factors) as well as changes in the firm’s own 
creditworthiness. To improve transparency, the standard requires various disclosures, including 
information relating to how changes in fair values affect a firm’s earnings. 
 7 
The stated objective of FAS 159 is to improve financial reporting by providing firms with 
the opportunity to mitigate artificial volatility in reported earnings caused by measuring related 
assets and liabilities differently. Adopting this standard will also allow firms to apply the fair 
value measurement basis to designated derivative assets and liabilities without having to apply 
complex hedge accounting provisions. Finally, standard setters believe that this standard will 
expand the use of fair value measurement and help to mitigate some of the limitations of the 
mixed-attribute reporting model. 
Because FAS 159 permits firms to fair value some of their liabilities, it has received 
considerable attention and resulted in much controversy over whether or not fair value gains 
(losses) from liabilities reflect economic income. In the following subsections, we highlight the 
main arguments in the debate for and against the fair value measurement of liabilities.
8
 
 
2.1.1. Argument for recognizing the fair value gains (losses) from liabilities as income. 
Better match between assets and liabilities 
 A central argument for fair valuing a firm’s liabilities is to better align the measurement 
basis of a firm’s liabilities with the measurement basis of its corresponding assets. Measuring 
liabilities at fair value will lead to a consistent measurement basis on both sides of the balance 
sheet if a firm has been measuring its assets at fair value. In contrast, if a firm’s assets are 
measured at fair value but its liabilities are measured at amortized cost, changes in market 
interest rates or the firm’s credit risk will affect only the fair value measurements of the firm’s 
assets but will not lead to a re-measurement of its liabilities. If the measurement of liabilities 
does not incorporate the effect of these changes, then there is an accounting income mismatch. 
                                                 
8
 See also, a discussion paper by IASB (2009) titled “Credit Risk in Liability Measurement” for an in-depth 
discussion of the issues pertaining to this debate. 
 8 
Consequently, net income (or other comprehensive income) will be distorted by the mismatch, 
and will not properly reflect the underlying economics of the firm. This argument also underlies 
the FASB’s long-term objective of measuring liabilities at fair value to be consistent with 
measuring assets at fair value.  
Hodder et al. (2006) provide some evidence that supports this argument. They examine 
properties of GAAP net income, GAAP comprehensive income, and full fair value income to 
determine which accounting income measure best reflects firm risk, and find that investors view 
the volatility of full fair value income as a better measure of firm risk than the other two 
measures. The authors interpret their results as suggesting that greater inclusion of fair value 
estimates will lead to reported accounting income that better reflects a firm’s underlying 
economic risk. Relatedly, Hirst, Hopkins and Wahlen (2004) also document that a full fair value 
income measurement is more likely to enable analysts to reach better informed value and risk 
judgments about a firm’s fundamentals. 
 
Merton’s theory: Wealth transfer between equity and debt holders 
Barth et al. (2008) outline the economic justification for fair value measurement of a 
firm’s liabilities based on Merton’s (1974) theoretical framework. Briefly, the equity value of a 
firm represents a call option on the value of its assets and the value of its debt is the strike price 
on the call option. Conversely, shareholders have an option to put the firm to debt holders. Hence 
the value of exercising that option increases when the value of the firm’s assets decreases. 
Likewise, the value of debt will decrease when firm value decreases since debt holders wrote the 
put option when they lent money to the firm.
9
 
                                                 
9
 The symmetric payoff between equity holders and debt holders is clearly illustrated in option pricing theory 
between the party that exercises the put option (i.e., the equity holders) and the party that writes the put option (i.e., 
 9 
The above argument can also be viewed based on the classic accounting equation that 
assets equal liabilities plus equity, for which liabilities and equity represent two classes of claims 
against the firm’s assets. An increase in the credit risk of the firm’s liabilities represents a 
transfer of wealth from debt holders to equity holders in the following way. As the firm’s ability 
to pay its liabilities diminishes, the potential loss to shareholders is limited to the amount of their 
investment. In contrast, debt holders may be unable to recover the principal amount they have 
lent to the firm since equity holders are not obligated to inject additional capital into the firm. 
Effectively, debt holders will “share” in the losses of the firm if the firm becomes insolvent. 
Therefore, the apparent gain to the firm is essentially an allocation of claims between the firm’s 
owners and its lenders.  
Supporting the above argument, Barth et al. (2008) find evidence that there are two 
countervailing equity value effects associated with increases in credit risk. The main effect is a 
decrease in equity value, arising from a decrease in asset value, and the secondary effect is an 
increase in equity value associated with a decrease in debt value. Barth et al. (2008) document 
that the relation between credit risk change and equity returns is significantly less negative when 
the firm has more debt. Their finding is consistent with the reasoning that debt holders subsidize 
wealth decreases. Hence their study indicates that debt value changes resulting from the firms’ 
credit risk changes represent a component of a firm’s economic income and should be considered 
for inclusion in a firm’s accounting income. 
 
2.1.2. Argument against recognizing fair value gains (losses) from liabilities as income 
Realizability issue 
                                                                                                                                                             
the debt holders). Specifically, equity holders will exercise their put option to transfer the firm to debtholders if firm 
value falls below the value of total debt outstanding in the firm.   
 10 
While Merton’s theory is theoretically sound in its reasoning, it may not incorporate 
some of the effects of market realities. In particular, opponents of fair valuing liabilities argue 
that accounting measurement of liabilities does not take into account factors such as low 
tradability and counterparty constraints that make realization of fair value changes in liabilities 
unlikely. Hence any reported profit accruing to the firm from fair valuing its liabilities is 
essentially theoretical.
10
  
The realizability argument against fair valuing liabilities is as follows. If liabilities are 
seldom transferred, it is not clear whether the firm has the ability to benefit from the change in 
liability value, even if there is a change in its fair value. A liability transfer usually requires 
negotiations between the firm (i.e., the debt issuer) and its counterparties (i.e., the debt holders), 
which often is a lengthy process. Hence, most liabilities are typically held to maturity for 
redemption at their face value by the firm and typically do not involve debt renegotiation despite 
changes in the market value of a firm’s debt. Consequently, the economic impact to a firm’s 
equity holders attributable to changes in the fair values of a firm’s liabilities is unclear.11  In 
support of the above argument, Koonce et al. (2011) find that investors’ fair value judgments are 
contingent on specific contexts even if these judgments appear inconsistent with the predictions 
of economic theory. Specifically, investors consider fair value changes to be less relevant for 
liabilities. Investors also view fair value changes as more relevant when firms anticipate selling 
or settling their financial instruments in the near-term compared to held-to-maturity financial 
                                                 
10
 An alternative view is that realizability is irrelevant to this issue. Proponents argue that unrealized fair value gains 
and losses relate to forgone opportunities arising from the decision to continue to hold assets or owe liabilities. 
These forgone opportunities (or opportunity costs) are viewed as informative and allow investors to reassess the 
value of the firm.  
11
 In contrast, unrealized fair value changes in assets can be recognized or disclosed in the financial statements 
because these assets are presumed to be readily available for disposal unless there are significant restrictions 
preventing the firm from disposing them.  
 11 
instruments. Thus, the authors suggest that reported fair value measurements of a firm’s 
liabilities might induce differential investor reaction compared with other financial instruments. 
 
Counter-intuitive nature of fair value gains (losses) from liabilities 
Critics argue that recognizing fair value changes in liabilities, particularly, recognizing 
changes in debt value arising from changes in a firm’s own credit risk will lead to 
counterintuitive results. The counterintuitive income statement effect argument remains one of 
the most commonly cited objections to fair valuing liabilities. When liability measurement 
includes the impact of a firm’s own credit risk, a firm reports an accounting gain from a decline 
in the credit quality of its liabilities. Opponents of fair value accounting for liabilities have 
argued that this gain is misleading and counterintuitive. Their basic premise is that reporting 
accounting gains from a firm’s deteriorating fundamentals provide misleading information 
signals. For example, Lipe (2002) documents that accounting information might convey 
misleading positive signals when a firm that is approaching bankruptcy uses fair value to 
measure liabilities. This arises because the firm reports a gain when its financial strength 
deteriorates and a loss when its financial strength increases.
12
  
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
We address the above issues by empirically examining the valuation and risk implications 
of fair value gains and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities for firms that adopt 
FAS 159. Our setting allows for a direct test of the above arguments about whether fair valuing 
                                                 
12
 More recently, Gaynor et al. (2011) show that a majority of their survey respondents (i.e., over 70%) 
misinterpreted fair value gains attributable to a deterioration in a firm’s creditworthiness as a positive signal and fair 
value losses as a negative signal. Using CPAs as survey respondents, many of these financial statement experts 
incorrectly assess a company’s credit risk as improving (deteriorating) when a fair value gain (loss) is recognized. 
Their study provides evidence in support of the claim that market participants might not be able to unravel the 
counterintuitive income statement effect arising from changes in liability fair values due to changes in a firm’s own 
creditworthiness. 
 12 
liabilities conveys decision-relevant information to market participants. Specifically, we are 
interested in examining whether gains and losses from liabilities are value relevant and risk 
relevant. 
The discussions in subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 indicate that there are equally compelling 
arguments in favor of and against both the relevance to investors for firm value and for firm risk 
of gains and losses resulting from fair value changes in liabilities. Consequently, we do not make 
directional predictions on whether gains (losses) from liabilities are value relevant and/or risk 
relevant. Instead, we express our hypotheses in null form as follows, and rely on the empirical 
analysis to indicate the direction of these relations: 
 H1:  FAS 159 gain and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities are not 
 value relevant. 
  
 H2:  FAS 159 gain and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities are not risk 
 relevant. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 FAS 159 sample 
We use accounting data and filing dates (10-Q and 10-K) from Computstat, and stock 
return and price data from CRSP. We hand-collect our main variable of interest, the change in 
fair value of liabilities included in earnings (ΔLIAB), using the following procedure. To identify 
firms that adopted the fair value option for their liabilities, we first select firms with non-zero 
change in fair value included in earnings for which the fair value option was elected (Compustat: 
TFVCEQ) and non-zero fair value liabilities (Compustat: TFVLQ). We then check the 10-Q and 
10-K filings of these companies to confirm that these firms adopted the fair value option for their 
liabilities. Finally, we hand-collect fair value changes in liabilities that are included in earnings 
 13 
(ΔLIAB).13 We also delete observations whose beginning-of-quarter stock price is below $3 in 
order to mitigate the extreme (small-denominator) effects of low-priced stocks on quarterly 
returns. Our final sample consists of 48 firms and 379 firm-quarter observations from the 1st 
quarter of 2007 to the 4th quarter of 2010.
14
 Of these 381 firm-quarters, 186 are from banks, 125 
from financial companies, 52 from insurance companies, and 18 from non-financial industries. 
Thus, approximately 95% of our sample observations represent firm-quarter observations from 
the financial industries. We refer to this sample as the full sample. 
Fair value changes in financial liabilities typically arise from either changes in a firm’s 
own credit risk or overall market interest rate risk. Some firms in our sample provide quantitative 
information regarding the fair value changes in their liabilities included in earnings as a 
consequence of changes in the firm’s own credit risk.15 For these firms, we hand-collect this 
information (ΔLIAB_CREDIT) to examine the value relevance of ΔLIAB_CREDIT. After 
deleting firms whose quarter beginning prices are below $3, we obtain 99 firm-quarter 
observations with fair value gains (losses) from liabilities attributable to changes in the firm’s 
own credit risk. These companies include American International Group, Citigroup, Goldman 
Sachs, JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Northstar Reality Finance, PMI Group and 
Popular Inc. We refer to this sample as the reduced sample. 
                                                 
13
 Most firms that have adopted the fair value option report the changes in the fair value of their designated liabilities 
either in the form of text or table format in the 10-Q and 10-K accounting footnotes. We provide some examples of 
fair value option tables from the 10-Q (or 10-K) notes in the Appendix. 
14
 FAS 159 was officially issued in February 2007. The standard took effect for the fiscal year beginning after 
November 15, 2007, although early adoption was permitted. On July 1, 2009, FAS 159 was codified into 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 825, Financial Instruments.  
15
 The following are two examples of such disclosures: 
Citigroup Inc. 2008 Q3: “The estimated change in the fair value of these liabilities due to such changes in the 
Company's own credit risk (or instrument-specific credit risk) was a gain of $1,525 million and $112 million for the 
three months ended September 30, 2008 and September 30, 2007, respectively, and a gain of $2,576 million and 
$241 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2008 and September 30, 2007, respectively.” 
American International Group 2008 Q3:“During the three- and nine-month periods ended September 30, 2008, 
AIG recognized a loss of $184 million and a gain of $1.1 billion, respectively, attributable to the observable effect of 
changes in credit spreads on AIG’s own liabilities for which the fair value option was elected.” 
 14 
3.2 Research design  
We first analyze the valuation implications of the gains (losses) from the change in fair 
values of liabilities included in earnings. We do so by estimating the following model that relates 
stock return to fair value liability gains and losses: 
SIZE_RETi,t  = α0 + α1 NI_ΔLIABi,t + α2 ΔLIABi,t + ei,t   (1) 
 
where SIZE_RETi,t is quarterly size-adjusted return measured from five trading days after the 
filing date of the quarter t-1 10Q (10K) to five trading after the filing date of quarter t 10Q (10K). 
We measure quarterly returns up to five trading after the 10-Q and 10-K filing dates to ensure 
that the returns reflect investors’ responses to the information on filing dates. Consistent with 
Barth et al. 2008, we use size-adjusted returns.
16
 ΔLIABi,t is recognized FAS 159 gains or losses 
from liabilities per share and NI_ ΔLIABi,t is income before extraordinary items per share 
excluding ΔLIABi,t. Thus, NI_ ΔLIABi,t represents income that excludes of the effect of  fair value 
changes in liabilities and ΔLIABi,t represents the incremental income statement effect from the 
measurement of fair value changes in liabilities. We scale each income variable by beginning of 
quarter stock price.     
The coefficient on ΔLIABi,t, our main variable of interest, will be positive if it is value 
relevant. In contrast, this coefficient will not be reliably different from zero if the information in 
fair value gains (losses) from liabilities is not valuation relevant or if there are significant 
reliability concerns regarding its measurement. Consistent with prior research, we expect a 
positive coefficient on NI_ ΔLIABi,t.  
Firms that adopted the fair value option are required to provide the fair value changes in 
liabilities on an instrument by instrument basis. As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of fair value 
                                                 
16
 Using raw returns does not change our inferences in all of our analyses.  
 15 
liability gains (losses) arising from changes in credit risk was one of the most controversial 
features of FAS 159. To provide empirical evidence regarding the value relevance of this income 
component, we first hand-collect the fair value gains (losses) from each instrument. Then, we 
classify these gains (losses) into liability gains (losses) from “debt” instruments which should be 
highly affected by firms’ credit risk changes and gains (losses) from “other” instrument which 
should be more influenced by the overall market interest changes. “Debt” instruments include 
short-term and long-term debt, subordinated debt, and notes payables. “Other” instruments 
include repurchase agreement, federal home loan bank advances, borrowed funds, time deposit, 
etc. We examine the value relevance of these instrument-level fair value changes using the 
following regression model: 
 SIZE_RETi,t  = α0 + α1 NI_ΔLIABi,t + α2 ΔDEBT_INSTi,t + α3 ΔOTHER_INSTi,t + ei,t,   (2) 
 
where ΔDEBT_INST denotes the total gains (losses) from the fair value changes in the debt 
instruments and  ΔOTHER_INST denotes the total gains (losses) from the fair value change in 
other instruments. 
However, the fair values of the debt instruments are also affected by the overall market 
interest change. To remove this concern, we use the reduced sample of firms that disclose the 
gains (losses) from liabilities solely due to the firms’ credit risk changes. Specifically, we collect 
fair value liability gains (losses) per share attributable to changes in the firm’s own credit risk 
(ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t ). We employ the difference between gains and losses from liabilities 
(ΔLIABi,t) in this reduced sample and ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t  as the fair value changes in liabilities 
attributable to factors other than changes in the firm’s own credit risk (ΔNON_CREDITit). We 
examine the value relevance of ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t using the following regression model: 
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SIZE_RETi,t = α0 + α1 NI_ΔLIABi,t + α2 ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t + α3 ΔNON_CREDITi,t  
             + ei,t            (3) 
 
Each income variable is scaled by beginning of quarter stock price. If fair value gains (losses) 
from liabilities due to changes in the firm's own creditworthiness are value relevant, we expect a 
positive coefficient on ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t.  
Our second hypothesis relates to the risk implications of FAS 159 fair value gains and 
losses from liabilities. We rely on the following model, adapted from Hodder et al. (2006), to test 
the risk relevance of these gains and losses: 
BETAi,t  ( STD_RETi,t) = α0 + α1 σ(NIi,t) + α2 σ(NI_ΔLIABi,t) + ei,t  (4) 
 
where  BETAi,t denotes market model beta estimated using firm's monthly stock returns and a 
value-weighted index of monthly returns , measured over 8 quarters before quarter t; STD_RETi,t 
denotes the standard deviation of monthly returns measured over 8 quarters before quarter t;
17
 
σ(NIi,t) denotes the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items per share; and 
σ(NI_ΔLIABi,t) denotes the standard deviation of NI_ΔLIAB. We measure these variables on a 
rolling basis using the 8 most recent observations, with a minimum requirement of at least 4 non-
missing firm-quarter observations for each firm.
18
  In this regression, we are interested in 
whether σ(NIi,t) is incrementally associated with the market risk proxy measures. If the market 
perceives that the gains (losses) from liabilities add noise to earnings, then the coefficient on 
σ(NIi,t) will not be incrementally associated with the market risk proxies after controlling for 
σ(NI_ΔLIABi,t).   
                                                 
17
 Using the standard deviation of market-adjusted or size-adjusted returns does not change the results.  
18
 We use the standard deviations of earnings estimated with 4, 5, 6, or 7 quarters because our sample period is 
relatively short. Using 8 quarters to estimate the standard deviation greatly reduces the sample size. We note that our 
inferences are unchanged when we use this smaller sample..    
 17 
 To minimize the effect of outliers, we delete observations in the top and bottom 1 percent 
of the distributions of NI_∆LIAB, ∆LIAB, ΔDEBT, ΔOTHERS, ΔLIAB_CREDIT), and trim 
observations with absolute value of studentized residuals greater than 3. In all our regression 
tests, we use standard errors clustered by firm to account for within-firm correlations in residuals, 
and include year dummies to control for year fixed effects.   
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Univariate analyses   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables and characteristics of the sample 
firms used in the value relevance analyses. Specifically, Panel A provides the descriptive 
statistics of the variables in the full sample. The standard deviation of the gains (losses) from 
liabilities per share (ΔLIAB) is about 80% of the standard deviation of NI_ΔLIAB. This 
indicates that the impact of ΔLIAB on our sample firms’ net income is not negligible.19 To 
confirm the economic significance of ΔLIAB, we separate ΔLIAB into gains and losses, and 
investigate the magnitude of ΔLIAB when it is positive and negative. Panel B reports the 
frequency and the average absolute value of ΔLIAB and NI_ ΔLIAB when ΔLIAB is positive, 
negative and zero (GAINS, LOSSES, AND ZERO, respectively). In our sample, the fair value 
gains (losses) from liabilities are evenly distributed with 156 gain observations and 153 loss 
observations.
20
  The average absolute value of ΔLIAB is 0.039 (0.038) when firms report gains 
(losses) for ΔLIAB. Given that the average absolute value of NI_ΔLIAB is 0.106 (0.065) when 
firms report gains (losses) for ΔLIAB, the average absolute value of ΔLIAB in Panel B confirms 
the economic significance of ΔLIAB. We also examine the average ratio of the absolute value of 
                                                 
19
 The sum of the average NI_ΔLIAB and ΔLIAB is not equal to the average NI because all the income variables are 
trimmed at the top and bottom 1%.  
20
 70 firm-quarters have zero ΔLIAB. Although we only include firms that report fair value gains and losses from 
liabilities after adopting FAS 159 for their liabilities, some firms report zero ΔLIAB intermittently. 
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ΔLIAB to the absolute value of NI_ΔLIAB. Interestingly, the average ratio seems to be overly 
high. The average ratio is 1.963 in the gain cases and 0.385 in the loss cases. The unduly high 
average ratio in the gain cases is mainly because some firms report high fair value gains from 
liabilities when the absolute value of the income before such gains (NI_ ΔLIAB) is low, making 
the denominator of the ratio low.        
We also investigate how unique our sample firms are in terms of the proportion of the fair 
valued assets and liabilities to the total assets. The primary objective of FAS 159 is to reduce 
unnecessary income volatility by applying the same measurement basis to both assets and 
liabilities. If so, it will be the firms with reasonable amount of fair valued assets and liabilities 
that benefit by adopting FAS 159. Panel C report the sample firms’ leverage and the proportion 
of the fair valued assets and fair valued liabilities to the sample firms’ total assets. The average 
leverage (LEVERAGE; total liability over total assets) is 82.8%. This relatively high leverage 
result from the fact that the sample firms are mostly in the financial industries. The average 
proportions of the fair valued assets and liability are 35.8% and 9%, respectively.
21
 Panel D 
reports the proportion of the fair valued assets and fair valued liabilities to the total assets of the 
firms in the financial industries (after excluding our sample firms) in Compustat from the year 
2007 to 2010, which is our sample period. The average proportions of the fair valued assets and 
liability are 16.6% and 1.1%, respectively. Panel C and D shows that our sample firms can 
reduce unnecessary earnings volatility by fair valuing liabilities because they have a larger base 
of fair valued assets and fair valued liabilities than other firms in the financial industries.
22
      
                                                 
21
 Excluding non-financial firms from the sample does not change the figures in Panel C. For example, if we exclude 
the non-financial firms, the leverage and the proportion of the fair valued assets and liabilities in total assets become 
84.9%, 36.8%, and 9.5%.  
22The average “FAIR VALUED ASSETS” and “FAIR VALUED LIAB” in Panel C (0.358 and 0.090) are 
significantly different from those in Panel D (0.166 and 0.011). The t-statistics of the differences are 15.38 and 
20.02.   
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Table 2 reports Spearman and Pearson correlations for the variables used in the full 
sample value relevance analysis. As expected, quarterly size-adjusted returns are positively 
correlated with net income (Pearson and Spearman correlation = 0.169 and 0.251, respectively). 
When we decompose NI into NI_ΔLIAB and ΔLIAB, the correlation between returns and 
NI_ΔLIAB is positive and significant (Pearson correlation = 0.168) and the Pearson correlation 
between returns and ΔLIAB is not significant. These univariate results show that it is NI_ΔLIAB 
that drives the positive association between return and net income and that ΔLIAB is not value 
relevant.  However, increase in the market overall uncertainty or deterioration of a firm’s credit 
risk can have two offsetting effects on firm value: a direct and negative effect related to 
increased market or firm-specific credit risk and an indirect and mitigating effect of gains from 
liability (Barth et al. 2008). Thus, we should test how the result turns out after controlling for the 
direct effect, which will be performed in the next section.  
The correlations between NI_ΔLIAB and ΔLIAB in Table 2 show a Pearson correlation 
between NI_ΔLIAB and ΔLIAB of -0.618 and a Spearman correlation of -0.454. The high 
negative correlation between NI_ΔLIAB and ΔLIAB suggests that FAS 159 may be effective at 
mitigating financial statement volatility caused by different measurement bases in assets and 
liabilities. 
 
4.2 Value relevance - main results    
Table 3 presents our main results on the value-relevance of the fair value accounting for 
liabilities. The positive and statistically significant coefficient (coefficient = 0.398, t = 5.33) 
relating  quarterly net income (NI) that includes FAS 159 fair value gains and losses from 
liability to quarterly size-adjusted return  is consistent with the results of prior research. When 
we decompose NI into its respective components, we find a significant positive association 
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(0.521, t=3.78) between SIZE_RET and net income excluding the gains (losses) from liabilities 
(NI_∆LIAB). We also find a significant and positive relation between SIZE_RET and the per 
share fair value gains (losses) from liabilities (∆LIAB). The coefficient on ∆LIAB is 0.279 
(t=2.28). The magnitude of the coefficient on ∆LIAB is smaller than that of NI_∆LIAB, 
indicating the transitory nature of ∆LIAB. These results indicate that ∆LIAB is value relevant 
after controlling for the information in NI_∆LIAB. Our results suggest that investors perceive 
reported FAS 159 fair value liability gains and losses as value relevant.
23
 
Table 4 presents the value relevance results after decomposing ∆LIAB into the fair value 
changes in debt instruments (ΔDEBT_INST) which include short-term and long-term debt, 
subordinated debt, and notes payables and other instruments (ΔOTHER_INST) which include 
repurchase agreements, federal home loan bank advances, borrowed funds, time deposits, etc. 
Given that the debt instruments are more highly influenced by a company’s credit risk changes, 
if the market perceives the fair value changes related to the change in a firm’s credit risk as value 
relevant, we expect the coefficient ΔDEBT_INST to be positive. We find that the both debt and 
other instruments are value relevant.
 
The coefficients on ΔDEBT_INST and ΔOTHER_INST are 
0.282 and 0.571 (t = 3.30 and 2.40), respectively.
24
      
Panel A of Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics of the reduced sample of firms that 
disclose the change in fair value of liabilities per share due to changes in the firm’s own credit 
                                                 
23
 A concern in this analysis is that our sample period includes the crisis period. Stock returns in the crisis period can 
be highly affected by investor sentiment, which may affect the value relevance analysis in this period. To address 
this concern, we delete the year 2008 observations. We find that the results are not sensitive to deleting 2008 
observations. .  
24
 To ensure that the fair value change in debt instruments is primarily affected by an entity’s creditworthiness, we 
use a reduced sample of firms that disclose the fair value gains (losses) from liabilities resulting from the change in 
firms’ credit risk (ΔLIAB_CREDIT), which is used in Table 5. Specifically, we examine the correlation between 
ΔDEBT_INST and ΔLIAB_CREDIT in the sample. We find that the Pearson correlation between ΔDEBT_INST 
and ΔLIAB_CREDIT in this reduced sample is 92.3% (Spearman 66.5%). Although there is an issue of whether the 
finding in the reduced sample can be applied to the large sample, we consider this high correlations evidence that the 
change in creditworthiness in an entity is highly influential to the fair value changes in the “debt” instruments. 
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risk The results in Panel A indicate that the mean returns and NI for the reduced sample are 
negative. The mean returns and income before extraordinary items per share (NI) scaled by the 
firm’s beginning of quarter stock price are negative because the reduced sample firms are mainly 
large banks whose performance deteriorated during the 2008 crisis which is included in our 
sample period.  We decompose ΔLIAB into the change in fair value of liabilities per share due to 
changes in the firm's own credit risk (ΔLIAB_CREDIT) and other macroeconomic factors 
(ΔNON_CREDIT). This decomposition indicates that most of the variation in ΔLIAB (standard 
deviation = 0.108) is caused by ΔLIAB_CREDIT (standard deviation of ΔLIAB_CREDIT = 
0.102 and standard deviation of ΔNON_CREDIT = 0.035). We therefore infer that the effect of 
ΔLIAB_CREDIT on net income is not negligible for these sample firms.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports value relevance test results for the reduced sample. The results 
confirm the value relevance of liability gains (losses) arising from change in firms’ credit risk. 
We find a significant positive coefficient on ΔLIAB_CREDIT, which indicates that investors 
perceive an accounting gain (loss) attributable to a change in the firm’s own credit risk as value 
relevant.   
 
4.3 Risk relevance    
In this section, we first investigate whether the impact of FAS 159 reduces the income 
volatility of firms that choose to fair value their liabilities. A primary objective of FAS 159 is to 
reduce firms’ income volatility caused by inconsistency in the measurement of assets and 
liabilities on the balance sheet. We compute the standard deviation of each sample company’s NI 
[σ (NI)] and NI_ΔLIAB [σ (NI_ΔLIAB)] over our sample period. Table 6 Panel A reports the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in our risk relevance analysis. The results show that the 
average standard deviation of NI is smaller than the average standard deviation of NI_ΔLIAB by 
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0.346, and the difference is statistically significant (t-stat: 7.22). This indicates that earnings 
volatility would have been considerably larger if ΔLIAB was not included in computing net 
income. Thus, it appears that the adoption of FAS 159 serves to reduce firms’ income volatility.  
This result differs from Hodder et al. (2006) who report a significant increase in the 
standard deviation of the full fair value earnings when full fair value changes are included in 
earnings. Thus, whether σ (NI), which is much smaller in magnitude than σ (NI_ΔLIAB), is 
more risk relevant than σ (NI_ΔLIAB) is not ex-ante clear. Hence, we examine this question by 
examining which of these measures of income volatility corresponds more closely with firm risk, 
proxied by beta and monthly return volatility. 
Table 6 Panel C presents our risk-relevance analyses. We find that both σ (NI) and σ 
(NI_ΔLIAB) are risk-relevant when we do not control for each other in the same regression. 
When the dependent variable is BETA, the coefficient on σ (NI) and σ (NI_ΔLIAB) are 0.264 
and 0.201 (t = 4.26 and 3.46), respectively. When we include both σ (NI) and σ (NI_ΔLIAB) in 
the regression model, we find that only the coefficient on σ (NI) loads (0.283; t= 2.10). We 
obtain similar results when we use standard deviation of the returns (STD_RET) as the 
dependent variable. Hence, our results suggest that ΔLIAB is incrementally informative to 
investors when assessing the underlying economic risk of the firm.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines how investors perceive fair value liability gains and losses arising 
from FAS 159 adoption. Consistent with the objectives of standard setters, we find that there is a 
positive association between a firm’s stock returns and FAS 159 gains and losses from liabilities. 
We also find that the controversial gains and losses from liability due to a firm’s credit risk 
change are positively related to the stock returns after controlling for the income before such 
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gains and losses.  The results suggest that these reported gains and losses from liabilities are 
value-relevant to investors in making their investment decisions. We also find that there is a 
positive association between market-based risk measures and income volatility that incorporated 
FAS 159 gains and losses. These findings indicate that these fair value measurements are risk-
relevant to investors in assessing the economic volatility of the firm.  
Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that examine how investors assess the 
impact of fair value gains and losses from liabilities. Our study should be of interest to standard 
setters and regulators with regard to whether firms should fair value their liabilities and whether 
fair value gains and losses from liabilities should be treated differently. Our study thus provides 
interesting evidence that contributes to the debate and controversy surrounding the fair value 
accounting for liabilities. 
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Appendix 
Example of a fair value option table in the 10-Q and 10-K notes 
 
 
Goldman Sachs 2010 1Q note 
 
 
The Fair Value Option Gains / (Losses) 
 
The following table sets forth the gains/(losses) included in earnings for the three months ended 
March 2010 and March 2009 as a result of the firm electing to apply the fair value option to 
certain financial assets and financial liabilities, as described in Note 2. 
 
  Three Months 
 Ended March 
 2010  2009 
 (in millions) 
Unsecured long-term borrowings  $ 84  $ (135) 
Other secured financings   (4)   25 
Unsecured short-term borrowings  13   (67) 
Receivables from customers and counterparties   (38)   (2) 
Other liabilities and accrued expenses   69   82 
Other   (3)   (26) 
        
Total  $ 121  $ (123) 
            
 
The effect of the firm’s own credit spread on income 
 
The following table sets forth the net gains/(losses) attributable to the impact of changes in the 
firm’s own credit spreads on borrowings for which the fair value option was elected. 
 
  
Three Months  
Ended March 
  2010        2009 
  (in millions) 
Net gains/(losses) including hedges $ 107 $ (197.00) 
Net gains/(losses) excluding hedges   109   (192.00) 
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The net gain/(loss) attributable to changes in instrument-specific credit spreads on loans and loan 
commitments for which the fair value option was elected was $1.07 billion and $(1.21) billion 
for the three months ended March 2010 and March 2009, respectively. The firm attributes 
changes in the fair value of floating rate loans and loan commitments to changes in instrument-
specific credit spreads. For fixed rate loans and loan commitments, the firm allocates changes in 
fair value between interest rate-related changes and credit spread-related changes based on 
changes in interest rates. See below for additional details regarding the fair value option.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of full sample for value relevance analysis 
This panel presents the full sample descriptive statistics of the variables that are used in the value 
relevance analysis. 
 
  Mean Std Dev 5th % Median 95th % 
      
SIZE_RET -0.009 0.386 -0.483 -0.037 0.402 
NI -0.030 0.169 -0.317 0.010 0.067 
NI_ΔLIAB -0.026 0.172 -0.292 0.011 0.092 
ΔLIAB 0.001 0.139 -0.042 0.000 0.068 
ΔDEBT_INST 0.015 0.124 -0.023 0.000 0.068 
ΔOTHER_INST 0.008 0.082 -0.010 0.000 0.017 
      
 
SIZE_RET =   quarterly size-adjusted return measured from five trading after the 
filing date of quarter t-1 up to five trading days after the filing date of 
quarter t 
 
NI =   income before extraordinary items per share for quarter t, scaled by the 
beginning-of-quarter stock price 
NI_ΔLIAB =   income before extraordinary items per share minus the change in fair 
value of liabilities included in earnings for which the fair value option 
was elected, scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock price 
 
ΔLIAB =   the change in fair value of liabilities per share included in earnings for 
which the fair value option was elected, scaled by beginning-of-quarter 
stock price 
ΔDEBT_INST = the per share change in fair value of total debt instruments included in 
earnings for which the fair value option was elected, scaled by 
beginning-of-quarter stock price. The instruments include short-term 
borrowings such as the current portion of long-term debt, subordinated 
debt, long-term debt, and notes payable. 
 
ΔOTHER_INST = the per share change in fair value of other instruments which are not 
debt instruments included in earnings for which the fair value option 
was elected, scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock price. The 
instruments include repurchase agreement, federal home loan bank 
advances, borrowed funds, time deposit, etc. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Gains and losses from the change in the fair value of liabilities 
 
This panel presents the frequency and the average absolute value of gains and losses from 
liabilities (ΔLIAB) and income before such gains and losses (NI_ ΔLIAB) when sample firms report 
positive, negative, and zero ΔLIAB (GAINS, LOSSES, and ZERO, respectively).   
 
    
 
GAINS LOSSES ZERO 
 
   
FREQUENCY 156 153 70 
PERCENTAGE 41.16 40.37 18.47 
MEAN [ABS (ΔLIAB)] 0.039 0.038 0.000 
MEAN [ABS (NI_ΔLIAB)] 0.106 0.065 0.052 
MEAN [ABS (ΔLIAB) / ABS (NI_ΔLIAB)] 1.963 0.385 0.000 
        
 
Panel C: Fair value assets and liabilities of the full sample 
This panel presents the average leverage and fair value assets (fair value liabilities) relative to the 
total assets of the sample firms. Leverage is measured as firms’ total liabilities over total assets.     
 
     LEVERAGE FAIR VALUE ASSETS FAIR VALUE LIAB 
    
Mean 0.828 0.358 0.090 
Std Dev 0.177 0.248 0.127 
        
 
Panel D: Fair value assets and liabilities of financial institutions (excluding the sample 
firms) in Compustat during the sample period 
 
This panel presents the average leverage and fair value assets (fair value liabilities) relative to the 
total assets of the firms in the financial industries (excluding the sample firms) in the Computstat 
from 2007 to 2010.     
 
     LEVERAGE FAIR VALUE ASSETS FAIR VALUE LIAB 
    
Mean 0.749 0.166 0.011 
Std Dev 0.249 0.241 0.074 
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TABLE 2 
 
Correlation matrix 
 
Table 2 presents the correlations among the key variables used in our value relevance analyses. 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are reported, respectively, above and below the diagonal. P-
values are reported based on two-tailed tests (in parentheses). See Table 1 for variable definition. 
 
 
  A B C D 
     
SIZE_RET (A)   0.169 0.168 -0.040 
  ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.445) 
NI (B) 0.251   0.626 0.226 
 ( 0.000)  ( 0.000) ( 0.000) 
NI_ΔLIAB (C) 0.258 0.853   -0.618 
 ( 0.000) ( 0.000)  ( 0.000) 
ΔLIAB (D) -0.093 -0.147 -0.454   
 ( 0.072) ( 0.004) ( 0.000)  
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TABLE 3 
 
Regression of returns on the change in fair value of liabilities included in earnings 
 
Table 3 presents the main results of our regression analyses examining the association between 
quarterly returns and the change in fair value of liabilities included in earnings for which the fair 
value option was elected. The dependent variable is quarterly size-adjusted return. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for within-firm 
correlations in residuals, and year dummies are used to control for year fixed effects.  The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
   
NI 0.398***  
 (5.33)  
NI_ΔLIAB  0.521*** 
  (3.78) 
ΔLIAB  0.279** 
  (2.28) 
Intercept -0.088*** -0.090*** 
 (-4.46) (-4.68) 
Year controls Yes Yes 
Observations 377 374 
Adj. R
2 0.090 0.087 
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TABLE 4 
 
Regression of returns on the change in fair value of liabilities included in earnings: 
Instrument by instrument 
 
Table 4 presents the main results of our regression analyses examining the association between 
quarterly returns and the change in fair value of liabilities, instrument by instrument. The 
dependent variable is quarterly size-adjusted return. The standard errors are clustered by firm to 
account for within-firm correlations in residuals, and year dummies are used to control for year 
fixed effects.  The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
NI_ΔLIAB 0.643*** 
 (4.66) 
ΔDEBT_INST 0.282*** 
 (3.30) 
ΔOTHER_INST 0.571** 
 (2.40) 
Intercept -0.091*** 
 (-4.91) 
Year controls Yes 
Observations 368 
Adj. R
2 0.136 
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TABLE 5 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of reduced sample for value relevance analysis  
This panel presents the reduced sample descriptive statistics based on the nine firms that 
voluntarily provide changes in fair value of liabilities due to changes in a firm’s own credit risk. 
These firms are American International Group, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Merrill 
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Northstar Reality Finance, PMI Group, and Popular Inc. 
ΔLIAB_CREDIT is the change in fair value of liabilities per share due to such changes in the 
Company's own credit risk included in earnings, scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock price.  
ΔNON_CREDIT is ΔLIAB - ΔLIAB_CREDIT. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
  Mean Std Dev 5th % Median 95th % 
      
SIZE_RET -0.024 0.327 -0.395 -0.047 0.402 
NI -0.026 0.173 -0.340 0.018 0.103 
NI_ΔLIAB -0.035 0.170 -0.324 0.017 0.107 
ΔLIAB 0.009 0.108 -0.102 0.000 0.177 
ΔLIAB_CREDIT 0.004 0.102 -0.081 0.000 0.101 
ΔNON_CREDIT 0.005 0.035 -0.033 0.000 0.055 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression of returns on the change in fair value of liabilities resulting from the 
change in firms’ credit risk 
 
This panel presents the main results of our regression analyses examining the association 
between quarterly returns and the change in fair value of liabilities included in earnings for 
which the fair value option was elected. The dependent variable is quarterly size-adjusted return. 
All variables are defined in Table 1. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for 
within-firm correlations in residuals, and year dummies are used to control for year fixed effects. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
   
NI 0.464***  
 (3.74)  
NI_ΔLIAB  0.484** 
  (2.93) 
ΔLIAB_CREDIT  0.401** 
  (2.72) 
ΔNON_CREDIT  0.528 
  (0.87) 
Intercept -0.098** -0.100** 
 (-2.63) (-2.76) 
Year controls Yes Yes 
Observations 95 95 
Adj. R
2 0.120 0.101 
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TABLE 6 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the variables for risk relevance analysis  
 
This panel presents the full sample descriptive statistics of the variables that are used in the risk relevance 
analysis. We estimate the risk proxies and the two quarterly income measure volatilities over rolling 
eight-quarter periods, each ending with years from 2007 to 2010. We impose a minimum requirement of 4 
firm-quarter observations for these measures. σ (NI_ΔLIAB) - σ (NI) shows the difference between the 
standard deviations of the incomes with and without FAS 159 liability gains and losses. The t-
statistic of the difference is in parenthesis.    
 
  Mean Std Dev 5th % Median 95th % 
      
BETA 0.202 0.147 0.059 0.156 0.562 
STD_RET 1.508 1.117 0.217 1.238 3.831 
σ (NI) 1.467 1.956 0.049 0.769 5.873 
σ (NI_ΔLIAB) 1.850 2.356 0.083 0.879 7.892 
      
σ (NI_ΔLIAB) - σ (NI) 0.346     
 (t: 7.22)     
 
BETA =  market model beta estimated using firm's monthly stock returns and a 
value-weighted index of monthly returns, measured over 8 quarters 
before quarter t  
 
STD_RET =  standard deviation of monthly returns measured over 8 quarters before 
quarter t 
σ (NI) =   the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items per share 
where income is measured over 8 quarters before quarter t 
 
σ (NI_ΔLIAB) =   the standard deviation of NI_ΔLIAB where NI_ΔLIAB is measured 
over 8 quarters before quarter t 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression of beta and standard deviation of returns on the standard deviation of 
each income measure 
 
This panel presents the results of regression analyses examining the association between beta (and 
standard deviation of the monthly returns) and each income volatility measures. All variables are defined 
in Panel B. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for within-firm correlations in residuals, 
and year dummies are used to control for year fixed effects. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
                
 BETA  STD_RET 
                
σ (NI) 0.264***  0.283**  0.044***  0.059*** 
 (4.26)  (2.10)  (4.17)  (2.77) 
σ (NI_ΔLIAB)  0.201*** -0.056   0.030*** -0.014 
  (3.46) (-0.27)   (2.84) (-0.79) 
Intercept 0.120*** 1.404*** 0.593***  1.346*** 0.132*** 0.058*** 
 (6.63) (7.37) (3.19)  (7.21) (6.96) (2.82) 
Year controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 314 318 317  318 316 313 
Adj. R
2 0.482 0.227 0.259  0.263 0.344 0.487 
                
 
 
 
